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WAGE EXPLOITATION AND THE NONWORSENESS CLAIM: 
ALLOWING THE WRONG, TO DO MORE GOOD 
David Faraci 
 
Owner offers full-time employment to Employee, for which the latter will receive 
compensation insufficient to meet his basic needs (food, shelter, etc.). Owner could 
offer Employee better compensation without lowering the net benefit of their 
interaction or eliminating her profits. Indeed, Employee’s compensation represents 
only a small fraction of the profits his work generates for Owner. Nevertheless, 
Employee, who has no feasible alternative for even approaching his basic needs, 
correctly concludes that the position on offer is his best option—including over any 
options he would have if Owner’s business did not exist. He therefore consents to 
work for Owner. No third parties are harmed by this interaction. 
I find the following view about this case intuitively plausible. This is a case of 
wage exploitation: Owner is taking advantage of Employee in paying him an unfairly 
low wage.1 Owner acts wrongly in doing this, even though she had no prior 
obligation to benefit Employee, both she and Employee consent to the interaction, it 
makes them both better off, and there are no negative externalities.2 Nevertheless, 
third parties should not do anything that would lead Owner to rescind her offer of 
employment, given these same considerations of consent and mutual benefit. Call 
this thought—that an interaction like Owner and Employee’s can be wrongfully 
exploitative, yet third parties should not do anything (expected) to prevent or 
eliminate it—the “Reasonable View.” 
In this article, I argue that the Reasonable View is indeed reasonable, in the 
sense that there are perfectly consistent, intuitive ethical positions that vindicate it. 
                                                 
1 My argument does not depend on the assumption that the wrongness here stems from 
unfairness; other values might do the same work, several of which will be discussed in §1. 
However, the assumption of unfairness is dialectically useful because fairness is something many 
take to be valuable independently of its impact on autonomy and welfare, the values on which my 
main targets focus. It is also the value Wertheimer appeals to in his original discussion of the 
nonworseness claim. (Also see note 5.) 
2 If “exploitation” is a thick moral term (with a negative valence) then saying that Owner acts 
wrongfully is redundant. I will talk as though exploitation is morally neutral simply so that I can 
refer to this as a case of exploitation without taking sides. This is merely for convenience; I take 
no official position on whether “exploitation” is morally neutral. For arguments that it is neutral, 
see Valdman (2009). It is worth mentioning that even some defenders of wage exploitation seem 
comfortable with such neutrality. For example, Kristof (2009, A35) writes that “while it shocks 
Americans to hear it, the central challenge in the poorest countries is not that sweatshops exploit 
too many people, but that they don’t exploit enough.” 
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The Reasonable View requires such defense because, as we’ll see, the current 
literature on wage exploitation often suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that there is 
no theoretical space for it. This is a mistake. 
I proceed as follows. In §1, I discuss how the contemporary literature 
(focusing primarily on the sweatshop literature) obscures the theoretical space for 
the Reasonable View. I focus on arguably the clearest symptom of this obscuration: 
the apparent plausibility of the nonworseness claim, according to which a consensual, 
mutually beneficial transaction cannot be “morally worse” than its absence 
(Wertheimer 1999, 289–93, though note that Wertheimer himself rejects the claim). 
Proponents do not defend the nonworseness claim as an upshot of a particular moral 
theory, such as the view that welfare and autonomy are all that matters morally. 
Rather, it is meant to play a central role in a purportedly theory-neutral defense of 
wage exploitation, and thus rejection of the Reasonable View. 
In §2, I explore the intuitive case for the nonworseness claim and argue that 
it relies on three errors. It fails to appropriately distinguish the evaluative from the 
deontic. It fails to adequately attend to the potential moral significance of the fact that 
different options are available to different agents. And it conflates value monism with 
value pluralism. Once these errors are exposed, it becomes clear that a perfectly 
sensible form of deontology3 is consistent with the Reasonable View.4 
Given my arguments, it can be tempting to conclude that only deontologists 
can embrace the Reasonable View. Indeed, it has been argued that the Reasonable 
View should be rejected because it faces “the paradox of deontology” (Ferguson 2016). 
I include a principled response to this objection in §2. In §3, I develop an example of 
a consequentialist theory consistent with the Reasonable View. This serves as a 
further response to the “paradox of deontology” objection, further illuminates the 
structure of the Reasonable View, and demonstrates that even consequentialists can 
endorse it.  
In §4, I consider the dialectical, theoretical, and practical implications of my 
arguments. My discussion shows that there is no theory-neutral argument for or 
against the Reasonable View. Whether interactions like Owner and Employee’s 
involve wrongdoing depends on both substantive ethical questions and empirical 
ones.5 It also serves my primary dialectical goal, which is to encourage everyone to 
                                                 
3 For present purposes, “deontology” is just non-consequentialism. 
4 Much of my argument can be read as an expansion upon Wertheimer’s own reasons for rejecting 
the nonworseness claim. More recent critics of the nonworseness claim include Arneson (2013), 
Bailey (2010), Barnes (2013), Malmqvist (2017), Preiss (2014), and Barnes (2013). 
5 This is another advantage of focusing on fairness (see note 1): most arguments against the 
unfairness of wage exploitation are not principled, but rather depend on empirical claims about 
how actual cases (e.g., sweatshops) differ from Owner and Employee’s. I discuss this further in §4.  
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more carefully distinguish their treatment of first- and third-party obligations. This 
is the point of the article’s subtitle: we must attend to the possibility that we should 
sometimes allow wrongdoing, in order to do more good. 
 
1. Whatever Happened to the Reasonable View? 
Until about 20 years ago, moral condemnation of sweatshops was nearly universal in 
the United States. As Powell and Zwolinski point out at the start of their (2012) 
defense of sweatshops, Ian Maitland could still comfortably title his (1996) article 
“The Great Non-Debate Over International Sweatshops.” Since then, numerous 
economists and philosophers have offered defenses of sweatshops in both the 
academic literature and popular media, largely focusing on the idea that sweatshop 
critics fail to understand the economics behind sweatshops (e.g., Kristof 2009; Kristof 
and WuDunn 2000; Krugman 1997; Maitland 1996; Powell 2014; Zwolinski 2007; for 
economic critiques of sweatshops see, e.g., Arnold 2010; Arnold and Hartman 2005; 
Coakley and Kates 2013; Kates 2015; Miller 2003; Pollin, Burns, and Heintz 2004). 
 In ethics, economic arguments can only take us so far. For example, they can 
give us reason to believe that sweatshop workers are benefitted (at least, financially) 
by the presence of sweatshops. They cannot show us that such benefits are all that 
matters morally, or even matter enough to outweigh other moral considerations, such 
as fairness. But suppose sweatshop work is both consensual and beneficial for 
sweatshop workers. And suppose that any steps third parties might take to improve 
sweatshop conditions would lead sweatshops to close. If moral objections to 
sweatshops are supposed to stem from concern for sweatshop workers, trying to 
improve their conditions starts to look morally counterproductive.6 If third parties 
care about people like Employee, perhaps they do better allowing such workers to be 
exploited. 
 This line of thought echoes Matt Zwolinski’s (2007) seminal defense of 
sweatshops. There, Zwolinski focuses explicitly on third-party obligations: 
My position is that there is a large gulf between concluding that the 
activities of sweatshops are morally evil and concluding that 
sweatshop labor ought to be legally prohibited, boycotted, regulated, 
or prohibited by moral norms. To the extent that sweatshops do evil 
to their workers, they do so in the context of providing their workers 
with a financial benefit, and workers’ eager readiness to consent to 
the conditions of sweatshop labor shows that they view this benefit 
                                                 
6 “[T]o the extent that there is something morally objectionable with [sweatshop conditions] the 
most natural explanation for this is that these conditions are bad for the persons who suffer them” 
(Powell and Zwolinski 2012, 451).  
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as considerable. This fact leads to the ultimate practical conclusion of 
this paper, which is that there is a strong moral reason for third 
parties such as consumers and host and home country governments 
to refrain from acting in ways which are likely to deprive sweatshop 
workers of their jobs . . . (Zwolinski 2007, 690) 
 Zwolinski’s argument against third-party interference may or may not be 
sound. Perhaps sweatshop workers are coerced into working in sweatshops7 or aren’t 
really benefitted (e.g., Arnold 2001; Kates 2015; Miller 2003). But even if his argument 
is sound, on its face it seems consistent with the claim that sweatshop owners 
wrongfully exploit their workers. This would be in keeping with the Reasonable 
View. If any relevant third-party intervention would lead Owner to rescind her 
offer—which, for the sake of argument, I assume to be the case throughout—perhaps 
third parties should refrain from interfering. What Owner does can still be wrong.  
Yet, strikingly, as time as passed, the literature has increasingly ignored the 
Reasonable View, or even suggested that there is no theoretical space for it. The 
progression of Zwolinski’s work provides a perfect example. In the article just 
discussed, Zwolinski (following Wertheimer), argues along the following lines. Most 
of us interact with people like Employee in ways that are not beneficial (e.g., don’t 
interact with them at all). Owner, by contrast, benefits Employee consensually. So, if 
Owner is doing something wrong, this must be in virtue of the truth of some 
interaction principle on which “one has special responsibilities to those with whom 
one interacts beneficially that one would not have if one had chosen not to interact 
with them” (Wertheimer 2006). If no interaction principle is defensible, it seems we 
should accept the nonworseness claim (again, that a consensual, mutually beneficial 
transaction cannot be morally worse than its absence). Zwolinski raises objections to 
some particular interaction principles, but is ultimately concessive: 
There are no doubt other arguments that could be made in defense of 
the interaction principle. All I have tried to do here is to show that 
some of the more obvious ones are not successful. The burden of 
argument is thus on those who wish to criticize sweatshop wage 
agreements to provide a coherent defense of the interaction principle, 
and thereby show how sweatshops’ marginal benefit to the poor of 
the developing world is worse than the complete lack of benefit that 
most of us provide. (Zwolinski 2007, 710) 
 
                                                 
7 This is not to be confused with the claim that workers are coerced within their employment 
relations, rather than coerced to enter into them. See, e.g., Arnold and Bowie (2003); for responses, 
see Sollars and Englander (2007) and Zwolinski (2007). 
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Just one year later in an article on price gouging, however, Zwolinski claims 
that on “a consequentialist moral framework, the nonworseness claim seems 
obviously true.” He then offers a general argument against the plausibility of 
interaction principles, maintaining that the nonworseness claim “is meant to have 
traction for deontological theories as well” (Zwolinski 2008, 357). 
[T]heories which subject A to a moral obligation to rescue B on 
condition of their interaction seem to suffer from both a defect of 
unfairness and a serious internal tension. A’s interaction with B is 
supererogatory, done with B’s consent, violates no independent moral 
constraints, and benefits B. Why, then, should the interaction itself 
place A under new moral obligations toward B, beyond those to which 
A and B mutually agree? On the face of it, it seems unfair to burden 
A with this extra requirement given that he is already doing more 
than is morally required of him. (Zwolinski 2008, 359) 
By the time we get to Zwolinski’s (2012) article with Benjamin Powell, we 
find him arguing that all “anti-sweatshop arguments” fail on theory-neutral grounds: 
The argument in this article . . . does not seek to refute the case against 
sweatshops from the perspective of a single narrow and controversial 
moral theory. Instead, it seeks to show that anti-sweatshop arguments 
fail in one of two ways: Either they fail internally, by running afoul of 
the moral criteria to which they themselves proclaim allegiance, or 
they fail in a way that is external but uncontroversial, by succumbing 
to objections that any reasonable moral theory ought to view as 
legitimate concerns. (Powell and Zwolinski 2012, 450) 
And while he and Powell do not reject interaction principles out of hand here, 
they take them to be largely irrelevant, on the grounds that sweatshop workers can 
simply be taken to have waived any relevant obligations: 
[W]e do not deny that entering into a relationship can create new 
obligations. We simply hold that it is implausible to hold that those 
new obligations are not waivable, even when one party regards the 
other’s waiving of the obligation to be a necessary precondition for 
entering into the relationship, and the other party strongly prefers the 
relationship without the obligation to no relationship at all. (Powell 
and Zwolinski 2012, 469) 
Importantly, this trend exists not only amongst sweatshop defenders; 
theorists on both sides have afforded insufficient attention to the theoretical space 
for the Reasonable View. Consider, for example, Jeremy Snyder’s (2010) overview of 
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the recent literature on sweatshops and exploitation. Snyder discusses numerous 
accounts meant to ground distinctive obligations for sweatshop owners—accounts 
stemming from concerns about local unfairness (Meyers 2004, 2007; Valdman 2008, 
2009; Wertheimer 1999); about obligations regarding structural injustice (Sample 
2003; Young 2004); about obligations of corporate citizenship (Crane and Matten 
2008; Néron and Norman 2008); about appropriate responses to globalization (Scherer 
and Palazzo 2007; Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006); and about the Kantian 
injunction against using others as mere means (Arnold and Bowie 2003; Bowie 1999; 
Popper 2006; Radin and Calkins 2006; Snyder 2008). Any one of these might be 
thought to wholly undermine the nonworseness claim. Yet while Snyder does 
question it, he doesn’t end up very far away himself, concluding that “a relationship 
is more likely to be exploitative but morally permissible when it is voluntary and 
mutually beneficial . . .” (Snyder 2010, 208).8 He does so, much like the later Zwolinski, 
because he runs together questions about Owner’s obligations with questions about 
third parties’:9  
[A] relationship might be said to be exploitative but morally 
permissible. This moral permissibility is typically extended in light of 
sufficiently great benefits to the exploitee or sufficient hardship if the 
relationship were prevented. The question of moral permissibility 
may be limited to whether third parties, such as state regulators, are 
justified in interfering with an exploitative relationship. (Snyder 2010, 
208) 
Thus, we find theorists on both sides of the sweatshop debate ignoring the 
Reasonable View, if not ruling it out as indefensible on supposedly theory-neutral 
grounds, by way of the nonworseness claim. In the next section, I argue that defenses 
of the nonworseness claim, and the attendant failure to recognize the theoretical 
space available for the Reasonable View, rest on three related theoretical errors: 
failure to appropriately distinguish the evaluative from the deontic; failure to 
adequately account for the potential moral significance of different options’ being 
available to different agents; and conflation of value monism with value pluralism. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Snyder does allow that permissible exploitation “may create a form of moral residue, where the 
exploiter may have a duty to make up for the element of exploitation or to take steps to reduce 
the structural causes of exploitation” (Snyder 2010, 208). 
9 Or at least appears to do so. Given other things he says, it may be possible to read Snyder as 
using “morally permissible” in a non-standard sense, meaning something like “moral for others to 
permit.” But even if this is Snyder’s intention, the phrasing is unfortunate given the standard 
meaning of “morally permissible” and the pattern of conflation recorded here. 
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2. The Nonworseness Claim and the Reasonableness of the Reasonable View 
Here is Wertheimer’s original statement of the nonworseness claim: 
Suppose that we criticize A for engaging in an unfair mutually 
advantageous transaction with B. A defends himself by appealing to 
what I shall call the nonworseness claim: “Look, you grant that I have 
a right not to transact with B. If B is better off if I engage in an unfair 
transaction with B than if I do not transact with B at all, it certainly 
can’t be morally worse for me to engage in such a transaction with B. 
Given that I have a right not to transact with B and that transacting 
with B is not worse than not transacting with B, it can’t be seriously 
wrong for me to engage in an unfair transaction with B.” (Wertheimer 
1999, 289) 
Following this line of thought, the champion of the Reasonable View charges 
that Owner’s hiring Employee is wrongful because it is unfair. Owner replies that 
since Employee is better off, and she didn’t have to benefit him at all, her benefitting 
him can’t be wrongful.  
On its face, this is a rather strange reply. The obvious rejoinder is that the 
presence of a benefit isn’t what’s at issue; unfairness is. Zwolinski’s contention that 
the nonworseness claim seems obviously true for consequentialists further highlights 
this oddness. After all, Wertheimer just told us what moral value Owner’s exploiting 
Employee might negatively impact: fairness. Nothing prevents consequentialists 
from acknowledging the value of fairness. And so nothing prevents consequentialists 
from claiming that even though “transacting with B is not worse for B than not 
transacting with B at all,” it is nevertheless worse all things considered because of its 
unfairness (Zwolinski 2008, 357, bolding mine). 
As an analogy, suppose someone were to propose a variant of the 
nonworseness claim that lacks the consent condition—i.e., claim that a morally 
optional interaction cannot be wrongful just so long as all parties are made better off, 
even if this is achieved through coercion. It would be baldly question-begging for 
someone to invoke this variant in response to a complaint that some employees don’t 
consent to their employment. And it would be quite odd to claim that this variant is 
obviously true for consequentialists. It is only obviously true for consequentialists 
who deny the value of anything other than welfare—i.e., for welfarists. Likewise, the 
real nonworseness claim is only obviously true for consequentialists who deny the 
value of anything other than welfare and autonomy (or whatever undergirds the 
importance of consent). And there are plenty outside of that camp.  
If the nonworseness claim isn’t question-begging, something else must be 
going on here. I submit the following explanation. Both Wertheimer and Zwolinski 
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are banking on our sharing a certain evaluative intuition: welfare is morally 
important; indeed, it is important enough that gains in welfare matter more than 
losses in fairness. Thus, the state of affairs in which Employee is unfairly benefitted 
seems more good than the state in which he is fairly left in poverty.  
Now suppose you are a consequentialist. For consequentialists, more goodness 
means more rightness. This makes it natural to infer a first-party deontic claim from 
the evaluative one (though I’ll challenge this in §3): Owner’s treating Employee 
unfairly can’t be more wrong than her leaving him in poverty, given that its result is 
more valuable. This provides a better reading of Zwolinski: he doesn’t really mean 
that consequentialists have to endorse the nonworseness claim; he means that any 
consequentialist who accepts the above evaluative claim also has to accept the deontic 
one. And again he (not unreasonably, I think) expects most people to embrace the 
former. 
 This also provides a clearer reading of the Wertheimer passage. A’s defense 
is that given that B consents and is made better off, the results of their morally 
optional interaction are more valuable than the results of its absence, regardless of 
how fair it is. This is why third parties shouldn’t do anything to prevent or eliminate 
that interaction. A expects everyone to accept this premise. A then infers the relevant 
deontic claim: “it can’t be seriously wrong for me to engage in an unfair transaction 
with B.”  
 It is worth pausing to notice how ambiguous language contributes to 
confusion here. Both Wertheimer and Zwolinski talk about what is “morally worse,” 
which is ambiguous between the evaluative and the deontic (among other things). 
This causes particular trouble in Zwolinski’s claim, quoted in §1, that champions of 
the Reasonable View need to “show how sweatshops’ marginal benefit to the poor of 
the developing world is worse than the complete lack of benefit that most of us 
provide.” This is only true if read as a deontic claim: what sweatshop managers do 
must be more wrong than what most of us do. But Zwolinski’s phrasing invites an 
evaluative reading—suggesting, mistakenly, that champions of the Reasonable View 
need to show the results of sweatshop labor to be less good than the results of third-
party inaction.  
If all parties to this debate were consequentialists, this failure to distinguish 
the evaluative from the deontic might not seem so striking or problematic. But many 
are not; indeed, Snyder’s (2008) views are explicitly Kantian. Yet as we saw, Snyder 
doesn’t leave much room for the Reasonable View either. This, I believe, is because 
of a related theoretical misstep. 
To see it, consider a new kind of objection to the Reasonable View. Benjamin 
Ferguson argues that the Reasonable View should be rejected because it faces the 
“paradox of deontology.” The Reasonable View suggests that one is sometimes 
required to bring about less of what’s good. This is paradoxical, Ferguson charges, for 
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“[p]rinciples that prohibit what they are designed to promote suffer from a form of 
inconsistency” (Ferguson 2016, 964).10 
Ferguson’s argument can be dismissed fairly quickly: it is question-begging. 
He seems absolutely right that the correct deontic principles should reflect what 
matters morally. But he simply assumes that features of states of affairs exhaust what 
matters morally. And that is just to assume that consequentialism is true. Suppose 
instead that acting fairly itself matters morally. It may be that this cannot be, or is not 
best,11 understood as a reflection of the value of some feature of states of affairs—e.g., 
the idea is not that one should maximize fair actions. That does not reveal some deep 
problem with theories that require acting fairly even when this would produce a 
worse state of affairs; it reveals only that they are not forms of consequentialism.12 
                                                 
10 Ferguson’s solution is to accept a more limited version of the nonworseness claim: “If one or 
more strictly Pareto improving and consensual transactions are possible, then for at least one of 
these transactions, transacting is morally better than not transacting” (Ferguson 2016, 965). I think 
this fails to sufficiently capture the intuitiveness of the evaluative claim that an unfair benefit is 
more valuable than fair poverty, as well as its plausibility as grounds for accepting that third 
parties should allow Owner to exploit Employee. 
11 This may all be moot if every moral theory can be “consequentialized.” Campbell Brown (2011) 
argues that they cannot. (He references Dreier (1993), Louise (2004) and Portmore (2007) as 
theorists who endorse the thesis that they can, “or something close to it” (Brown 2011, 750, fn.1).) 
However, Brown defines consequentialism in terms of “maximizing the good.” This is too narrow 
for our purposes, given that all relevant parties accept that Owner is not obligated to hire 
Employee even if doing so would maximize the good. (The one exception of which I am aware is 
Bailey (2010), who argues that consequentialists should reject the nonworseness claim because it 
violates consequentialism’s commitment to maximizing the good; but this suggests to me only 
that Bailey has an overly narrow conception of consequentialism, since few contemporary 
consequentialists in- or outside the wage exploitation literature deny the existence of the 
supererogatory.) In §3, I take consequentialism to include any theory whose deontic commitments 
are entailed by its evaluative commitments, where value supervenes on features of (sets of) states 
of affairs. I offer no argument here that all views can be consequentialized on this understanding 
of consequentialism. My suspicion is that they can, but that many—including, arguably, the 
Reasonable View—are not best understood as forms of consequentialism. 
12 This is perhaps easiest to see on—but crucially does not demand—a buck-passing view on which 
facts about value are a function of facts about reasons (e.g., Scanlon 1998), and (say) one always 
has decisive reason to distribute benefits fairly. Note that this is not just a problem for Ferguson, 
but for many (perhaps all) appeals to the “paradox of deontology.” For example, Alexander and 
Moore (2015) write that “[d]eontologists need their own, non-consequentialist model of 
rationality, one that is a viable alternative to the intuitively plausible, ‘act-to-produce-the-best-
consequences’ model of [moral] rationality that motivates consequentialist theories. Until this is 
done, deontology will always be paradoxical.” But while deontologists do need a model of 
rationality, it is a mistake to claim that without one, their view is “paradoxical.” That is to 
question-beggingly judge deontological theories’ coherence against a background assumption that 
acting morally is about producing good outcomes. This is especially problematic given that 
10 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering what makes Ferguson’s objection 
tempting. For while Ferguson is not the first to claim that deontology is paradoxical, 
this is far from the most common reaction to deontological claims on which more 
rightness goes hand-in-hand with less goodness. Consider Thomson’s (1985) classic 
case of the surgeon who considers sacrificing one patient to save five others, often 
deployed as a counterexample to consequentialism. The deontologist’s position is 
that killing the one to save the five is impermissible, despite the fact that it would 
generate an all-things-considered more valuable outcome than (permissibly) allowing 
the five to die. 
The typical consequentialist response is not to call deontology paradoxical, 
but rather to resolve the apparent tension between the evaluative and the deontic, to 
either bite the bullet and insist that killing the one is right, or accept that killing the 
one is wrong but insist that the outcome of doing so wouldn’t be better after all (e.g., 
by arguing that doctors’ doing such things would discourage people from seeking 
medical attention).  
I submit that part of the explanation for this difference in reaction is that most 
judge not only that it would be wrong for the surgeon to kill the one to save the five, 
but also that third parties should prevent the surgeon from doing so. By contrast, the 
intuition that third parties should allow Owner to exploit Employee often survives 
reflection, alongside the intuition that Owner is doing something wrong. I believe 
this apparent tension between first- and third-party obligations has exacerbated the 
appearance of tension between the Reasonable View’s evaluative and deontic 
commitments.13 This may make it more tempting to raise principled objections like 
Ferguson’s, rather than to attempt to alleviate the tension, as most do in the surgeon 
case.  
In addition to the quotation from Snyder in §1, more ambiguous (and in some 
cases downright bizarre) language in the literature provides dialectical evidence for 
this explanation. Wertheimer raises the question of whether actions like Owner’s 
could be “seriously wrong” without telling us what distinguishes wrongness from 
                                                 
deontologists are often working “bottom-up,” starting from substantive intuitions about what 
morality or rationality requires, ones the presumed consequentialist default can’t (easily) 
accommodate. All of this is symptomatic of the all-too-common, illegitimate assumption that to 
say that something matters morally (is valuable) is to say that it merits promotion as a feature of 
states of affairs. For a relevant, useful distinction between “Moorean” and “Kantian” value 
concepts see Bradley (2006). 
13 Or, perhaps, vice versa. It is unclear to me which of these mistakes is primary, whether people 
have the evaluative intuition and infer both first- and third-party deontic claims, or whether 
people have the third-party deontic intuition and infer the evaluative and first-party deontic 
claims. It may differ from person to person. Perhaps Zwolinski, a consequentialist, (implicitly) 
reasons the first way, while Snyder, a deontologist, reasons the second.  
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“serious” wrongness. The implicit question seems to be: if third parties shouldn’t do 
anything to stop it, just how wrong could it be? In the same vein, Robert Mayer goes 
so far as to claim that sweatshop owners might “be right to do wrong” (Mayer 2007, 
614). 
But the apparent tension between first- and third-party obligations here is 
illusory. The asymmetry can be readily explained by the fact that different options 
are available to different agents, and the relationship between this fact and certain 
deontological constraints. Consider a deontological theory, comprising the following 
claims: 
D1 It is supererogatory to promote welfare.  
D2 It is impermissible to distribute gains in welfare unfairly, 
unless fair distribution is impossible or otherwise 
impermissible. 
D3 It is impermissible to force someone to do something she is 
morally permitted not to do. 
By D1, Owner is not obligated to hire Employee. But since Owner could 
distribute the benefits of her interaction with Employee fairly, by D2 her failure to 
do so is impermissible. If she hires Employee, she is required to compensate him fairly 
(this is our interaction principle). Third parties find themselves in an importantly 
different position. By D3, they cannot force Owner to hire Employee and compensate 
him fairly. They therefore have no way to permissibly distribute gains in welfare 
fairly, as we are assuming their only other options are to do nothing, in which case 
the gains in welfare will be distributed unfairly, or to take actions that would prevent 
or eliminate Owner’s offer, in which case there will be no gains to distribute. This is 
a perfectly coherent set of claims, one consistent with the Reasonable View. 
The failure to recognize the importance of different options’ being available 
to different agents is also reflected in Powell and Zwolinski’s claim that sweatshop 
workers have waived employers’ obligations to them. Much like third parties, 
Employee has no permissible means of ensuring that he is hired and compensated 
fairly; it’s one or the other. Given that, of course he will consent to being exploited. 
But, clearly, the fact that he agrees to be exploited simply because he has no way to 
get Owner to give him his due does not mean that Owner’s obligation is waived. If I 
owe you $100 but offer to pay you only $50, the fact that you agree because you have 
no way to get me to pay you the total amount does not mean you have waived your 
right to the other $50, at least not in any sense that implies I don’t still owe you that 
$50. 
Hopefully, the reasonableness of the Reasonable View is becoming more 
apparent. But to complete its defense, one further issue must be addressed: 
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Zwolinski’s objection to interaction principles discussed in §1, his contention that “it 
is puzzling how it could be worse by any moral standard . . . for A to provide some 
help than it is for him to provide none” (Zwolinski 2008, 357).  
To make this concrete, consider an interaction principle that requires you to 
donate 10% of your income to charity, but only if you choose to donate anything at 
all. This does seem unfair; indeed, it seems downright bizarre. Presumably, something 
like the moral significance of welfare undergirds the fact (if it is a fact) that donating 
to charity is supererogatory. But if the moral significance of welfare merely suggests 
donating, why would it require donating more once you begin? This seems no less 
bizarre as a deontological side constraint than it would as an implication of a 
consequentialist calculus.14 
That bizarreness, however, is not a feature of interaction principles per se; it 
is a feature of monistic interaction principles on which a single value requires more 
of you as you respond properly to it. Crucially, this is not the sort of interaction 
principle at work here. The intuition behind the claim that Owner acts wrongly is 
not that Owner has to benefit Employee more because she has benefitted him some. 
Rather, it is that she is keeping for herself an unfair portion of the benefits they create 
together; a greater portion of those profits is rightfully his. Owner’s hiring Employee 
generates new obligations not because the moral significance of welfare requires 
more of her now that she’s helped him, but because the independent moral 
significance of fairness has become salient within their interaction.15 Once we 
understand this, the worry that interaction principles place unfair burdens on the 
generous vanishes. Owner runs afoul of her interaction obligation because she seeks 
to take for herself too much of what she and Employee create together.  
This is the crucial feature of the Reasonable View that Zwolinski’s criticisms 
miss. It is misleading to say that Owner is “providing help.” If that’s all she were 
doing, then of course it would be better than doing nothing. But her interaction with 
Employee is mutually beneficial, and fairness may well have something to say about 
how those benefits are to be distributed. This is simply a reflection of the fact that 
some values may generate new obligations within—perhaps only within—
interactions.16 
                                                 
14 Though for an attempt to make this more palatable under deontology, see Snyder (2008). 
15 This is assuming that any prior unfairness placed no obligations on Owner. This, of course, 
relates to the view that wage exploitation is wrongful because it involves taking advantages of 
past injustice (e.g., Malmqvist 2013; Sample 2003). 
16 “Any transaction or relationship that creates a social surplus gives rise to a new moral feature—
fairness or unfairness—that does not arise outside of that transaction or relationship” (Wertheimer 
1999, 291). 
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It should now be clear that the intuitions used to motivate the nonworseness 
claim pose no principled threat to the Reasonable View, at least for deontologists. 
Again, this is not to say that the nonworseness claim is false, but only that it admits 
of no theory-neutral defense. If it is true, it is true because, say, only welfare and 
autonomy matter morally. But that is precisely what champions of the Reasonable 
View can and should deny.  
In the next section, I argue that consequentialists, too, can embrace the 
Reasonable View. In addition to its obvious import for consequentialists, this is useful 
as a further response to Ferguson’s “paradox of deontology” objection and because, 
like many “consequentializing” exercises, it serves to further clarify certain structural 
features of the view in question. 
 
3. Reasonable Consequentialism 
In this section, I develop an example theory, “Reasonable Consequentialism,” that 
entails the Reasonable View, given two further stipulations about Owner and 
Employee’s case. The first is that Owner’s exploiting Employee would decrease net 
fairness; the second is that forcing Owner to hire Employee would decrease net 
autonomy.17 Reasonable Consequentialism is consequentialist in that all of its deontic 
commitments are entailed by its evaluative ones, where value supervenes on sets of 
states of affairs.18 It is also, therefore, consistent with the idea that more goodness 
entails more rightness.  
Because the Reasonable View involves supererogation—Owner isn’t required 
to hire Employee, though it would be good for her to do so—Reasonable 
Consequentialism is a form of satisficing consequentialism (e.g., Slote 1984). For 
simplicity’s sake, the satisficing level is set at the status quo: actions that generate 
                                                 
17 The first stipulation is fairly natural. It could turn out that in exploiting someone, one makes 
things more fair overall. But given Employee’s poverty, it does not seem much of a stretch to 
suppose that the local unfairness of Owner’s exploitative offer would lead to a globally less fair 
outcome. The second stipulation might seem more problematic. But note that any consequentialist 
who accepts that third parties can’t force Owner to hire Employee and compensate him fairly, 
despite the increase in welfare this would arguably bring—including Zwolinski and other 
defenders of wage exploitation—will presumably have to vindicate a fairly general prohibition on 
forcing people to do supererogatory things (or take this prohibition to be merely contingent on 
the details of employment practices, which seems counterintuitive). 
18 Some, of course, endorse narrower definitions of consequentialism. But as mentioned in note 
11, it is already doubtful that we can rest easy with a traditional “maximize the good” 
understanding of consequentialism, since it is a near point of agreement in the relevant dialectic 
that benefitting Employee is supererogatory. In any case, whether or not Reasonable 
Consequentialism appeals to consequentialists, it avoids structural objections like Ferguson’s. 
Thanks to Daniel Nolan for discussion on this point. 
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greater expected value than inaction are supererogatory; actions that generate less 
expected value than inaction are impermissible.19  
Now, consider the following states of affairs: 
EXPLOITED The result of Owner’s choosing to exploit Employee.  
NO HIRE The result of Owner’s choosing not to hire Employee. 
FAIR The result of Owner’s choosing to hire Employee and 
compensate him fairly. 
FORCED The result of Owner’s being forced to hire Employee 
and compensate him fairly. 
The view that third parties produce more good by allowing Owner to exploit 
Employee suggests that the relevant gain in welfare is more important than the loss 
in fairness (EXPLOITED > NO HIRE). But if Owner acts wrongly in exploiting Employee, 
then given consequentialism the result of her exploiting him must be less good than 
the result of her not hiring him (NO HIRE > EXPLOITED). That looks straightforwardly 
inconsistent. And that’s why the Reasonable View seems to be incompatible with 
consequentialism. 
But consequentialism is more flexible than this suggests. For it is perfectly 
possible for consequentialism to weight values differently in different contexts. Here, 
there is at least one relevant shift in context, one already discussed: the states of 
affairs accessible to third parties are different from those accessible to Owner. 
Everyone can access EXPLOITED and NO HIRE. Owner can make the relevant choices; 
third parties can incentivize her to make those choices. But only Owner can access 
FAIR, because (we are assuming) third parties have no way to incentivize her to 
willingly offer Employee fair compensation. And only third parties can access FORCED, 
because Owner can’t force herself to do something. So, Owner can access EXPLOITED, 
NO HIRE, and FAIR, while third parties can access EXPLOITED, NO HIRE, and FORCED. 
What’s more, there is a principled difference between these sets: only the latter 
involves value conflict—i.e., lacks a member that weakly dominates with respect to all 
values. 
                                                 
19 Neither inaction nor negatively defined actions such as not giving Employee a million dollars 
count as actions here. If inaction were an action, determining the status quo would require 
determining what action Owner would have taken if she took any action at all. If not giving 
Employee a million dollars were an action, Owner might be required to give Employee a million 
dollars, since not giving Employee a million dollars might well decrease welfare compared to the 
state of affairs resulting from her not not giving Employee a million dollars (depending how 
wealthy Owner is). 
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To see this, start with the states accessible to third parties: EXPLOITED, NO HIRE, 
and FORCED. By doing nothing, third parties bring about EXPLOITED. Third parties can 
instead bring about NO HIRE by doing something (expected) to incentivize Owner not 
to hire Employee. Or, by forcing Owner to hire Employee, third parties can bring 
about FORCED. As seen in Table 1, there is value conflict within this set: no member 
has at least as much welfare, fairness, and autonomy as the others. Something must 
be sacrificed.  
 
Table 1. Expected value gains/losses for third parties* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now consider the states accessible to Owner: EXPLOITED, NO HIRE, and FAIR. By 
doing nothing, Owner remains in NO HIRE. By exploiting Employee, Owner can bring 
about EXPLOITED. Or by choosing to hire Employee and compensate him fairly, Owner 
can bring about FAIR. Here, there is no conflict, as seen in Table 2. Owner can promote 
welfare without sacrificing anything of value, by choosing to hire Employee and 
compensate him fairly. FAIR weakly dominates. 
 
Table 2. Expected value gains/losses for Owner* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 EXPLOITED† NO HIRE FORCED 
Welfare  – + 
Fairness  +  
Autonomy   – 
*Shaded cells are the available maximum for a row (value). A shaded 
column (state of affairs) weakly dominates; here none do. 
†Gains/losses indexed to status quo (result of inaction) 
 EXPLOITED NO HIRE† FAIR 
Welfare +  + 
Fairness –   
Autonomy    
*Shaded cells are the available maximum for a row (value). A 
shaded column (state of affairs) weakly dominates; here FAIR does. 
†Gains/losses indexed to status quo (result of inaction) 
16 
 
In order to entail the Reasonable View, Reasonable Consequentialism needs 
to have the following deontic implications.  
(1) It is permissible for Owner not to hire Employee.  
(2) It is impermissible for Owner to exploit Employee.  
(3) It is impermissible for third parties to do anything (expected) to prevent 
or eliminate Owner’s offer.  
(4) It is impermissible for third parties to force Owner to hire Employee.  
Reasonable Consequentialism achieves this by calculating overall value with 
respect to sets of states of affairs,20 holding that (a) autonomy’s21 value is lexically 
prior to both welfare’s and fairness’; (b) welfare’s value is lexically prior to fairness’ 
conditional on the presence of value conflict within the relevant set; and (c) fairness’ 
value is lexically prior to welfare’s conditional on the absence of value conflict within 
the relevant set.22  
On Reasonable Consequentialism, promoting welfare is merely 
supererogatory. Therefore, (1) it is permissible for Owner not to hire Employee. 
If Owner exploits Employee, this would bring about greater welfare, but less 
fairness, as seen in the left-hand column in Table 2. Since there is no value conflict in 
the set of states accessible to Owner (FAIR weakly dominates), the loss in fairness 
outweighs the gain in welfare, and so exploiting Employee brings about less overall 
value. Therefore, (2) it is impermissible for Owner to exploit Employee. 
Third parties’ preventing or eliminating Owner’s exploitative offer would 
increase fairness but lower welfare, as seen in the center column in Table 1. Since 
there is value conflict in the set of states accessible to third parties, the gain in welfare 
outweighs the loss in fairness, and so preventing or eliminating the offer leads to 
lower expected value. Therefore, (3) it is impermissible for third parties to do 
anything (expected) to prevent or eliminate Owner’s offer. 
                                                 
20 For deontic claims, the relevant set contains the states accessible to the agent in question. For 
comparative evaluative claims, the relevant set contains the states being compared. Thus, for 
instance, because the set comprising EXPLOITED and NO HIRE involves value conflict, Reasonable 
Consequentialism judges that EXPLOITED > NO HIRE with respect to this set, in keeping with the 
evaluative claim used to motivate the nonworseness claim. 
21 Or whatever underpins the impermissibility of forcing Owner to do what she is morally 
permitted not to do. 
22 Holding autonomy fixed, this generates: Given a set of states of affairs (S1-Sn), SX is all-things-
considered better than SY iff (i) SX contains more fairness but no less welfare than SY or (ii) SX 
contains more welfare but no less fairness than SY or (iii) SX contains more welfare but less fairness 
than SY and there is no SZ with no less welfare than SX and no less fairness than SY or (iv) SX 
contains more fairness but less welfare than SY and there is some SZ with no less welfare than SX 
and no less fairness than SY. 
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Finally, since autonomy always has priority, forcing Owner to hire Employee 
and compensate him fairly would also lead to lower expected value, as per the right-
hand column in Table 1. Therefore, (4) it is impermissible for third parties to force 
Owner to hire Employee.23 
Of course, this conditional weighting scheme is ad hoc. For our purposes, 
though, that’s unobjectionable: its single motivation is exactly what we’d hope; it 
serves to capture, within a consequentialist framework, an intuition about how the 
value of fairness constrains us—an intuition naturally associated with deontology. 
When one must choose between welfare and fairness, one should choose welfare. 
This is why, where welfare and fairness conflict, the former has priority. But one is 
required to distribute welfare gains as fairly as one (permissibly) can. This is why, 
where welfare and fairness do not conflict, it is impermissible to promote the former 
without maintaining the latter.  
Reasonable Consequentialism entails and therefore serves as a possibility 
proof for consequentialist endorsement of the Reasonable View. It also avoids 
Ferguson’s complaints. Because the view’s deontic commitments are a direct 
consequence of its evaluative ones, it never recommends bringing about less of what 
it deems valuable; more goodness always means more rightness.  
 
4. Implications 
Both deontologists and consequentialists can endorse the Reasonable View. They can 
accept that the consensual, beneficial nature of certain employment relations (among 
others) should make us reluctant to do anything that would eliminate them. They 
can, at the same time, accept that the employers in question act wrongly in offering 
unfair compensation. 
 To see the dialectical implications of this conclusion, consider the following 
progression of argument in the exploitation section of Powell and Zwolinski’s (2012) 
defense of sweatshops. They begin with intuitive motivation for the possibility of 
consensual, beneficial, wrongful exploitation: a case in which “A offers to rescue B 
from drowning by selling B a spot on A’s boat for $10,000” (Powell and Zwolinski 
2012, 466). They then discuss potential differences between this case and sweatshops 
that might vindicate the idea that what A does in the boat case is wrong, without 
                                                 
23 Reasonable Consequentialism’s other implications are also in line with the Reasonable View: 
(5) By allowing Owner to exploit Employee, third parties create more welfare but less fairness, as 
seen by comparing the left-hand and center columns in Table 1. Given welfare’s priority under 
value conflict, this generates greater expected value, and is therefore supererogatory. (6) If Owner 
were to hire Employee and compensate him fairly, this would bring about greater welfare and 
have no negative impact on fairness or autonomy, as per the right-hand column in Table 2. This 
generates greater expected value, and is therefore supererogatory. 
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condemning sweatshop employers. For instance, rescuing B seems to impose little 
cost on A, but if Powell and Zwolinski are right that wage determination is made 
within a fairly narrow margin, the same may not be true of sweatshop employers. 
Next, they acknowledge that sweatshop wages may be lower than morally 
appropriate, but argue that this will often be due to background circumstances largely 
or entirely outside employers’ control. Thus, the thought goes, sweatshops may be 
bad, but it does not follow that employers are shirking their moral responsibilities. 
Finally, they consider Snyder’s (2008, 2010) view that employers owe a duty of 
beneficence to their employees. They respond by appealing to the intuitions 
undergirding the nonworseness claim, and respond briefly to Snyder’s objections to 
that claim.  
 In my view, the final step takes things in an unfortunate direction. What A 
does in the boat case does seem wrongfully exploitative, and not merely on the 
assumption that A violates a duty to rescue. Yet unless the wrongness of what A does 
is grounded in violation of a duty to rescue (i.e., unless “no interaction” is wrongful), 
the nonworseness claim suggests that what A does isn’t wrong after all. Even Powell 
and Zwolinski seem to find this counterintuitive. And if it seems at all tempting, I 
submit this is yet again because of a failure to distinguish first- from third-party 
obligations. If B would drown without A’s help, and third parties have no way to 
rescue B themselves, nor to get A to rescue B without exploitation, surely they should 
permit A to exploit B, rather than let B drown. We should not make the mistake of 
concluding from this that A does nothing wrong.  
The purpose of Owner and Employee’s case is to provide the same intuitive 
result, but within the context of an employment relation. Consider the dialectical 
situation if Powell and Zwolinski were to acknowledge the intuitive possibility of 
such cases. They might proceed much as they did with the boat case, asking what 
makes these cases seem wrongful, then considering the extent to which such wrong-
making-conditions are met by actual sweatshops. 
For example, I stipulated that “Employee’s compensation represents only a 
small fraction of the profits his work generates for Owner.” This claim was meant to 
elicit the intuition that this “small fraction” is unfairly small. Of course, sweatshop 
defenders sometimes suggest that market-clearing wages are fair wages, so they 
might simply reject this intuition. But this is far from necessary, unless their view is 
that market-clearing wages are ipso facto fair. A more common view, I suspect, is that 
market-clearing wages are fair because market forces (tend to) ensure that market-
clearing wages are fair—i.e., tend to prevent workers’ wages from representing “only 
a small fraction of the profits” their work produces—and thus that Owner and 
Employee’s case is importantly different from actual sweatshops. Indeed, Powell and 
Zwolinski say things arguably meant to make precisely this point: 
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The often cited fact that a sweatshop worker who produces, say, a 
pair of Reebok shoes is paid only one US dollar to make a shoe that 
sells for around $100 does not mean that Nike is walking away from 
the exchange with $99 and the worker with only $1. Most of the $100 
goes to paying for advertising, retailer markup, raw materials, 
transportation costs, and so on. The amount that actually accrues to 
Reebok as profit is generally no greater as a percentage of their 
investment than the profits in any other competitive industry. (Powell 
and Zwolinski 2012, 466–67) 
If accurate and representative, this claim might allow Powell and Zwolinski 
to accept the wrongful unfairness of what Owner does, but draw an important moral 
distinction between that case and actual sweatshops. If sweatshops are defensible on 
these grounds, if they do not meet relevant conditions of unfairness, there is simply 
no need for blanket theoretical moves like the appeal to the nonworseness claim—
especially when such moves threaten intuitions shared by defenders (e.g., about the 
boat case).24 We do better to focus our attention on development of relevant theories 
of fairness and other values, and questions about the extent to which actual 
employment relations (fail to) meet those theories’ conditions. This is not merely 
theoretically superior; acknowledging an intuitive wrong-making feature but 
showing that it does not obtain is surely more rhetorically forceful than simply 
rejecting your opponents’ intuitions about what makes things wrong, especially 
when you yourself have similar intuitions about similar cases. It also allows us to 
more carefully distinguish various available positions—e.g., here, two different views 
about why market-clearing wages are fair. 
Of course, this is far from the end of this debate. One need not accept that 
market-clearing wages are fair even if they are “equitable.” Perhaps they must also 
be living wages, or meet some other standard—e.g., a counterfactual market standard, 
                                                 
24 Of course, they would still need a response to Snyder, since his view concerns a duty of 
beneficence, rather than fairness. But this is not hard to come by: they initially appeal directly to 
what they take to be the intuitive implausibility of “holding that failing to benefit needy workers 
at all is better than benefiting them at a level which is (significantly) greater than zero but less 
than the morally required amount—even if workers themselves would strongly prefer and would 
like to choose the latter over the former,” only afterwards noting that this “draws on many of the 
same intuitions as those invoked in Zwolinski’s presentation of the ‘non-worseness claim’” 
(Powell and Zwolinski 2012, 469). They need not accept the general claim to raise these intuitive 
worries. And, indeed, I think these worries are more forceful against Snyder than against fairness-
based objections, as framing things in terms of a duty of beneficence invites Zwolinski’s own 
framings of what employers do as “helping,” as well as his fairness-based objection to monistic 
interaction principles. 
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like those championed by Valdman (2009) or Wertheimer (1999). Nor is this the only 
relevant point of potential disagreement about how realistic Owner and Employee’s 
case is. For example, some sweatshop critics will likely argue that the stipulation that 
third parties are limited to inaction or elimination of Owner’s offer is unrealistic, that 
there are third-party interventions that can improve actual sweatshop workers’ 
conditions without threatening their employment (e.g., Dawkins 2012; Malmqvist 
2013). Perhaps such interventions are morally permissible or even required. Indeed, 
this might be the case even if we accept that sweatshop employers do nothing wrong. 
Nothing prevents us from, say, championing redistribution on prioritarian grounds. 
In addition to these dialectical points, the arguments herein have important 
theoretical and practical implications. One of my tasks has been to expose some 
instances of theoretical oversimplification, which understandably abound in applied 
ethics. Knock-down theoretical arguments are attractive for their simplicity and 
elegance, as well as their ability to shield us from the need to do difficult empirical 
work. But we should not overestimate the prevalence of such “magic bullets.” Moral 
theory is incredibly flexible, and we should regard with suspicion arguments 
purporting to show that our intuitions in various cases are “paradoxical” or in 
“tension” with one another, merely because they do not fit easily into a simple 
theoretical structure. 
Finally, at the practical level, the problems with the nonworseness claim serve 
as a cautionary tale of a different sort. Many readers have likely had the experience 
of trying to keep students from moving too quickly from claims about what is morally 
wrong to claims about what we should act to prevent—often: what should be illegal. 
In these discussions, we tend to appeal to extra-moral considerations, such as 
epistemological worries or principles of liberalism. One of my goals in this article has 
been to reinforce the idea that there can be purely moral reasons to distinguish first- 
from third-party obligations. Even if a particular relation is wrongfully exploitative, 
it may be that the rest of us have moral reasons to allow this wrongdoing, because 
doing so will bring about more of what’s good.  
  
5. Conclusion 
Defenders of wage exploitation offer powerful economic and moral arguments that 
the welfare- and autonomy-promoting power of certain exploitative employment 
relations should make us reluctant to prevent or eliminate those relations. Some have 
taken this to further show that such exploitation is not wrongful. I have argued that 
this does not follow; the Reasonable View is a live option for both deontologists and, 
more strikingly, consequentialists. In light of this, I submit that debate over wage 
exploitation should be framed more directly in terms of the conditions that elicit 
intuitions of unfairness (or other values) and the extent to which those conditions 
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obtain within actual cases of apparent wage exploitation. Whatever we conclude, we 
should be more open to the theoretical and practical possibility that there are moral 
reasons to allow wrongdoing. Sometimes, allowing wrongdoing may do the most 
good.  
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